The Horn of Africa is witnessing serious and rapidly developing events that have begun to go beyond the borders of the internal conflict in Ethiopia and take on broader regional dimensions amid the escalation between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray forces and the alliances associated with them. This came after strikes reached Addis Ababa with military sites being targeted which reveals that the forces confronting the Ethiopian government possess modern and dangerous weapons and military capabilities capable of reaching the capital and targeting sensitive sites there.
At the same time Egyptian-Ethiopian relations witnessed a diplomatic escalation after Ethiopia expelled an Egyptian diplomat and Egypt responded in kind in a move that reflects the growing level of tension between the two countries. The escalation did not stop there as relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia reached a dangerous stage with the severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries which prompted the African Union to break its silence and call for calm and restraint and for avoiding further escalation because continuing along this path could ignite the Horn of Africa and open the door to a broader crisis in Africa. Here another paradox also emerges that deserves attention: Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is himself the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. How did Abiy Ahmed receive the Nobel Peace Prize while Ethiopia under his leadership witnessed one of the bloodiest wars namely the war between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray forces?
The Tigray War led to a huge number of deaths and estimates differ regarding the actual number of people killed due to the difficulty of documenting casualties during the war but what is certain is that the humanitarian catastrophe was enormous.
From here an important question arises regarding the Nobel Peace Prize received by Abiy Ahmed and whether it is necessary to reconsider it or call for its withdrawal from him especially in light of what Ethiopia witnessed in terms of war conflict destruction and the loss of large numbers of lives. Amid these developments comes the analysis of American writer and researcher Stephen A. Cook regarding Egypt’s role in the regional scene an analysis that takes on particular importance in light of the rapidly developing events in the region and Egypt’s relations with the United States Israel Europe Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Stephen Cook: Sisi Fooled You and Ate Your Lunch
In a striking reading of the nature of the transformations that Egyptian policy has undergone in dealing with regional and international issues American writer and researcher Stephen A. Cook presents in an article in Foreign Policy a perspective on the way Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi deals with the United States Israel and Europe as well as Egypt’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Cook is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and specializes in Middle Eastern and African affairs and he also writes for Foreign Policy.
The central idea put forward by Cook according to his article is that Egypt in recent years has no longer dealt with regional and international powers as a party waiting for what is offered to it but has instead begun to act according to its own calculations and interests and determine for itself the limits of what it can accept and what it can reject. In clearer terms the message Cook conveys to America Israel and Europe is that Sisi fooled you and ate your lunch.
Gaza and Israel
First Cook believes that Sisi succeeded in dealing with the Gaza and Israel issue and that Egypt managed this file and achieved what it wanted through two basic arguments. The first argument is the existence of an extraordinary level of popularity among the Egyptian people regarding the protection of Gaza and the Palestinian cause.
The second argument concerns the existence of peace between Egypt and Israel a peace that Egypt is expected to preserve because it represents for Egypt a component of Egyptian national security.
According to this view President Sisi was walking a very fine line between preserving the peace treaty with Israel on one hand and dealing with the Gaza issue and the popular pressure associated with it on the other. Nevertheless he managed to navigate this equation successfully.
The Ability to Deal with Hamas and America
The matter does not stop there. According to what Cook puts forward Egypt possesses capabilities that enable it to influence Hamas while at the same time possessing the ability to deal with the United States itself and with Israel. This point reflects the importance of Egypt’s role in the Palestinian issue particularly because Cairo possesses channels of communication and relations with multiple parties which gives it the ability to operate in a space that is not necessarily available to other parties.
Therefore according to the reading presented by Cook Egypt was not merely a party receiving demands but a party capable of using its political security and diplomatic cards to achieve its objectives.
Saudi Arabia… When the Equation Changed
One of the most striking points in Cook’s analysis concerns the relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Relations between the two countries are very strong and cannot be separated from the political economic and strategic interests connecting Cairo and Riyadh.
But Cook points to a change in the nature of the equation. Whereas Egypt had previously needed Saudi Arabia and its assistance amid difficult economic circumstances Riyadh according to this analysis dealt with the matter through careful calculations and the message was clear: no assistance or money would be provided without calculations and interests.
Here for clarification this statement regarding this point is Stephen Cook’s position and not my personal opinion.
But according to what Cook argues the equation has actually changed. Instead of Egypt being the party that needs Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia has become the party that needs Egypt on a number of issues. According to this analysis Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is the one who goes to President Sisi and makes very significant requests while Egypt deals with these requests from a different position.
Egypt responds and provides Saudi Arabia with some of what it requests but within the limits that Egypt itself wants to provide and not necessarily according to everything being requested. Here the major transformation in the nature of the relationship becomes apparent.
And the UAE Too
The same thing according to this reading happened with the United Arab Emirates. The UAE was facing very heavy attacks from Iran which made the regional circumstances more complicated for it.
At the same time it is no secret that the UAE possesses significant economic capabilities and has major interests and requests concerning the Egyptian economy. Nevertheless according to the analysis presented by Cook Egypt met these requests but within the limits desired by Cairo.
In other words Egypt did not act as though it was obliged to carry out everything it was asked to do but rather as a state that determines for itself the extent of its participation and what it can offer.
Egypt Did Not Enter the War
One of the fundamental points in this view is that Egypt did not enter the war. At a time when the region was witnessing dangerous military and political developments Cairo maintained its position and did not directly enter the war.
At the same time Egypt continued doing what it considered appropriate to its interests. Here lies the importance of Egypt’s position according to this reading. Cairo did not enter the war but at the same time it did not leave the scene.
Rather it moved politically and diplomatically maintained its relations and various channels of communication and continued dealing with all parties according to its own calculations.
Egypt Holds the Threads
If we want to summarize what Stephen Cook puts forward the central idea is that Egypt has become capable of doing what it wants according to its own calculations and has managed to hold a large number of threads in the scene at the same time.
It maintains peace with Israel as part of its national security it deals with the Gaza issue it has the ability to communicate with and influence Hamas it maintains its channels with the United States and at the same time manages its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE according to its interests.
Most importantly it did not enter the war.
Thus according to this reading Egypt did not allow itself to become a direct party to the war but at the same time it did not abandon its leading regional role nor stop using its political and diplomatic tools.
What Stephen Cook presents in his article opens the door to a different reading of Egypt’s role in the region. According to his view the equation is no longer simply that Egypt needs others and that others are the ones making the decisions. Rather Cairo is now operating in a broader space of autonomy in determining what it wants and does not want what it can offer and what it refuses to offer.
From Gaza to Israel and from Washington to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi the picture Cook draws is based on one idea: Egypt did not enter the war but it did not leave the scene either. It acted according to its calculations and managed its relations and the limits of its intervention in the way it considered appropriate.
And ultimately this is the most striking point in Cook’s reading: a state standing against major regional and international pressures maintaining channels of communication with different parties while at the same time trying to determine for itself where it stands when to intervene and what to offer.
And according to the phrase used in the context of this analysis what happened represents from Cook’s point of view an example of a state’s ability to stand up to America Israel and the world while at the same time doing what it considers appropriate for its own interests.
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