The way the United States deals with the Sudanese crisis and political transformations in Syria reveals a political paradox worth examining. It raises fundamental questions about the criteria Washington uses to determine who deserves international recognition and acceptance and whose doors should remain closed.
At a time when the US administration is refusing to grant Sudanese army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan an entry visa to New York to participate in the United Nations General Assembly meetings, the same administration has welcomed Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to the White House, even though until recently he was listed on US terrorism lists because of his former links to the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
This paradox reveals that US policy does not always follow consistent standards when dealing with leaders associated with armed conflicts or those who came to power under exceptional circumstances. Instead, it is also influenced by calculations of interests, alliances and geopolitical changes.
Al-Sharaa: From Terrorist Lists to a White House Welcome
In November 2025, US President Donald Trump welcomed his Syrian counterpart, Ahmad al-Sharaa, to the White House in a scene reflecting a major shift in the American position toward a man whose name had appeared on US terrorism lists.
The shift was not merely a passing diplomatic meeting. It followed a series of US decisions, including the removal of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list in July 2025, followed by the removal of al-Sharaa’s personal terrorist designation in November of the same year.
In August 2026, the US State Department announced the removal of Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. It also announced the removal of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham from the list of global terrorist entities subject to US sanctions. Thus, al-Sharaa moved from a period of pursuit, designation and sanctions to one of official engagement, restored relations and political and economic openness.
This raises the question: If Washington is capable of reconsidering its position toward a figure once designated as a terrorist and opening the doors of the White House to him, why does it adopt a different approach toward al-Burhan and refuse to grant him even an entry visa to participate in United Nations meetings?
Al-Burhan and Al-Sharaa: Why Are the Standards Changing?
There is no denying the differences in the political and military circumstances between Sudan and Syria. Nor can it be ignored that the US administration justifies its openness toward the new Syrian government through commitments related to combating terrorism, security cooperation and distancing Syria from extremist organizations.
However, these justifications do not eliminate the need to raise the question of double standards.
Washington, which once designated al-Sharaa as a terrorist, now deals with him as a president and officially welcomes him, while adopting a hard-line position toward al-Burhan and preventing him from entering its territory to participate in international meetings.
Even more strikingly, the United States imposed sanctions on al-Burhan in January 2025, citing allegations concerning violations committed by Sudanese army forces and the undermining of the democratic transition.
But is this alone sufficient to justify such a significant difference in diplomatic treatment? Have American standards become more closely tied to a ruler’s ability to provide guarantees that serve US interests than to the question of political legitimacy?
American Foreign Policy Has No Permanent Friends
The Syrian and Sudanese experiences demonstrate that Washington has the ability to change its positions radically when its political and strategic calculations change. A man who had faced measures because of his terrorist designation has become a political partner with whom the US administration engages, while the doors of New York remain closed to the commander of the Sudanese army.
This does not necessarily mean that the two situations are legally identical, nor does the removal of al-Sharaa’s terrorist designation establish the legitimacy of all his previous actions. It also does not mean that the sanctions imposed on al-Burhan should automatically be lifted.
However, the comparison reveals that political recognition and international relations do not always operate according to a single legal or moral standard. Rather, they are influenced by security and strategic interests, as well as the positions of the various parties on regional issues.
Sudan Should Not Be Secondary to American Calculations
The Sudanese crisis should not become merely a card in the regional struggle for influence or a means of exerting pressure on one of the parties to the war.
The Sudanese people, who have paid a heavy price for the conflict, deserve to see priority given to ending the war, protecting civilians, rebuilding state institutions and establishing civilian rule based on the will of the people.
Likewise, the refusal to grant al-Burhan a visa does not, by itself, settle the question of his political legitimacy, just as welcoming al-Sharaa to the White House does not constitute a final judgment on the legitimacy of all the practices of Syria’s new government.
A Balance of Interests or a Balance of Principles?
Ultimately, this is not about defending al-Burhan or exonerating his command from the allegations directed against it. Nor is it about ignoring al-Sharaa’s past or overlooking the previous US designations against him.
Rather, it is about holding US policy accountable for the standards it applies when dealing with leaders who have faced allegations, sanctions or terrorist designations before becoming acceptable partners in international calculations.
If Washington has been able to move from designating al-Sharaa as a terrorist to welcoming him as a president at the White House, observers have every right to question the grounds on which it treats al-Burhan differently and the extent to which political and strategic interests influence its decisions.
The problem is not that Washington changes its positions, but that principles appear to be applied to one side and set aside for another.
American policy thus seems to place the region before a balance with two weights and two measures: when interests surrounding a particular figure change, designations and previously closed doors change as well. But when that figure’s calculations conflict with Washington’s priorities, the doors to recognition and engagement remain closed.
The question that remains is this: Does Washington judge leaders according to consistent standards of legitimacy and accountability, or does the criterion for acceptance and rejection change according to its interests?
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